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Introduction 
 
 
Internal documents of the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) show that the group’s 
lobbyists – and lobbyists for individual drug makers – were heavily consulted by the White 
House and the congressional leadership late last year in the drafting of legislation designed to 
shield drug makers from legal accountability for injuries or deaths caused by their drugs and 
vaccines during government-declared health emergencies. 
 
The documents show that the industry got the near-total immunity from liability it wanted. 
 
BIO took the lead in coordinating the industry’s response to a Capitol Hill draft proposal and was 
invited to meetings at the White House and at the office of Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-
Tenn.) to make its case. BIO’s extensive membership list overlaps significantly with the 
membership of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the trade 
association of the brand-name pharmaceutical industry. BIO’s membership includes the top 10 
pharmaceutical companies in terms of U.S. sales – firms that collectively held 56.8 percent of the 
U.S. market in 2005, with sales of $143.5 billion. 
 
The internal BIO documents and e-mails show that the organization successfully pushed for a 
much broader liability shield than had been proposed on Capitol Hill or by the Bush White 
House. The drug makers were awarded a shield so impenetrable that it is extremely unlikely they 
would ever face lawsuits over products used to treat pandemic illnesses, even in cases of gross 
negligence or gross recklessness. The final law stipulated that the drug makers could only be 
sued if they engaged in “willful misconduct.” In short, they would have to act “intentionally to 
achieve a wrongful purpose knowingly without legal or factual justification and in disregard of a 
known or obvious risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that the harm will outweigh 
the benefit.” 
 
At the same time as it insulated pharmaceutical companies from lawsuits, Congress also 
established a “process fund” to assist those injured or killed by vaccines, drugs or other 
countermeasures they receive in response to a government-declared health emergency. But 
Congress failed to appropriate any money for the fund 
 
The measure, which was never considered in committee, was surreptitiously set up for passage 
under cover of darkness. Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn.) inserted the 40-page text 
into the Department of Defense appropriations bill late on a Sunday night. His maneuver was 
conducted with the approbation of Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.) after House and 
Senate conferees had completed work on the bill – and without the knowledge of at least some 
conferees. In fact, those conferees had already received assurances from the leadership that the 
controversial liability shield would not be included in the spending bill. 
 
The two main conspirators in the liability shield insertion, Hastert and Frist, have long been 
darlings of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. They rank third and ninth, 
respectively, among members of the current Congress in campaign contributions from the two 
industries since the 2000 election cycle. Sen. Richard Burr (R-N.C.), who drafted a bill that 
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provided the basis for Frist’s measure, ranks No. 4. In sum, the three have received more than 
$1.2 million from the two industries in this time period. 
 
But the drug industry did not rely on campaign contributions alone to sway lawmakers. Its 
members also turned to their tried-and-true technique of blanketing Capitol Hill with influence 
peddlers. Pharmaceutical companies and trade associations deployed a platoon of at least 158 
lobbyists to influence vaccine and pandemic-related issues in 2004 and 2005. 
 
Many of those lobbyists brought insider knowledge of the government’s machinations to their 
influence-peddling jobs, and a few were especially well positioned to tweak the liability shield 
measure to satisfy their employers’ wishes. Their forces included at least 84 revolving-door 
lobbyists – influence peddlers who were previously employed by the federal government – of 
whom seven were former members of Congress.  
 
Conveniently, these former public servants included two former top health care aides to Frist, a 
former assistant to the HHS secretary, and a former House staffer who had helped draft language 
for a 2004 law that served as a predecessor to Frist’s liability shield provision. 
 
Also lobbying on pandemic issues was Joshua Hastert, son of the speaker of the House. 
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Section I: Drug Makers Invited to Craft Liability Shield 
 
 
On Nov. 12, 2005, Dave W. Boyer, director of federal government relations for BIO, received 
from a Senate staffer a draft of legislation that would shield makers of vaccines and drugs to 
prevent and treat pandemic diseases from liability. The language barred legal recourse against 
drug makers whose products killed or injured those who received them unless a drug maker’s 
action amounted to “willful misconduct.” It said that, at a minimum, willful misconduct would 
be an act or failure to act taken with “actual knowledge” that it would represent “a significant or 
unreasonable risk to human health,” with “actual knowledge that injury to human health or 
death” would result and with a “conscious failure to act to avoid presenting a significant or 
unreasonable risk to human health.” The draft left the details of defining the more precise 
parameters of willful misconduct to the Department of Health and Human Services, then added, 
“‘willful misconduct’ shall not include any act or a failure to act constituting mere negligence or 
strict liability in any form.”1 
 
This wasn’t good enough for BIO. 
 
On Nov. 13, Boyer sent an e-mail to an undisclosed list of recipients, telling them that BIO had 
sent an analysis of the draft to the Hill “in response to their request for comment on a bicameral 
majority pandemic/biodefense liability proposal.” He attached a BIO’s comments, which claimed 
that the language in the draft could conceivably leave drug and vaccine makers on the hook for 
actions that the law recognizes as “gross negligence,” a lower standard that does not require a 
defendant to intend to cause harm in order to be found liable.2  
 
“The bill seems to open up liability for conduct that might be characterized as gross negligence 
and other lesser (i.e., non intent) standards,” BIO’s analysis said. “We believe that this creates an 
unclear and overly broad standard and the bill should clearly and categorically restrict 
manufacturer liability to such an intent standard.”3 
 
BIO said, “We have strong concerns about the proposed definition of ‘willful misconduct,’ since 
it eliminates the intentionally wrongful nature of the act or failure to act.”4 
 
In other words, BIO was arguing that the legislation should stipulate explicitly that drug and 
vaccine makers must mean to cause harm in order to face liability. 
 
The analysis also touched on a number of other “key areas where it will be important to modify 
or clarify the bill’s language.”5 
 
BIO’s goal, it said, was “to achieve the right balance in the event that patients are injured 
following the administration of a countermeasure under this program.”6 
 
The analysis expressed concern that plaintiffs could nonetheless have their cases heard by a jury. 
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“While these provisions are helpful, the lack of any restriction on jury trial is problematic,” BIO 
said. “Where injured parties have no other avenue for relief, juries are likely to find ways to 
award damages.” 
 
On Nov. 15, Boyer sent a message to an undisclosed e-mail list announcing that BIO had been 
called to a White House meeting and that he and two BIO colleagues attended along with Sean 
Callinicos, a lobbyist who represented Sanofi Pasteur, and Greg Levine, an Arnold and Porter 
lawyer. At that time, Levine was representing Pfizer and Hoffman LaRoche on the issue of 
“Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2006, provisions related to 
pandemic influenza.” Indeed, he had only signed on to represent Roche on the issue a week 
earlier, on November 8, according to a lobbying registration form later filed with the Senate.7  
 
Boyer wrote, “The meeting started with Barry Jackson, Karl Rove’s deputy, explaining that it 
was important to the President that a bill move this year, and that they had invited industry to 
discuss what they understood to be a few key remaining points of contention.”8 
 
Three days later, Boyer and lobbyists for three pharmaceutical companies were summoned to a 
meeting with the staff of Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn.), along with officials from 
the Justice Department, the Department of Health and Human Services and the White House 
office of legislative affairs.9 
 
“At Senator Frist’s staff’s request, this morning, BIO (Tom and I) participated in a meeting with 
three other industry representatives (Sanofi and an outside counsel who works for both Pfizer 
and Roche, I believe), administration staff (HHS, DoJ and WH Leg Affairs), and Liz Hall to 
further discuss liability,” Boyer wrote in an e-mail to undisclosed recipients.10 
 
The e-mail revealed the extent to which Frist was coordinating the legislative push with the 
White House and the urgency with which Frist intended to pass the legislation. 
 
“Frist’s staff indicated that the Leader would not be inclined to move a bill that the 
Administration didn’t support, much less opposed,” Boyer wrote, adding, “Senate leadership is 
pushing for a final deal to be cut before staff go home for Thanksgiving.”11  
 
Frist’s deadline came and went. 
 
On Dec. 1, Boyer sent another e-mail to his undisclosed list of recipients. He wrote that 
Republican House and Senate staffers were still discussing the liability provisions for makers of 
pandemics drugs and vaccines. Boyer also disclosed that the staffers were aiming to insert the 
liability shield measure into the DoD appropriations bill.12 
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Section II: Frist Shepherds Law to Fruition 
in the Dead of Night 
 
 
In the following week, rumors swirled that the congressional leadership would seek to insert a 
liability shield for the makers of pandemic drugs and vaccines into the Defense appropriations 
bill, along with funding to purchase these products. The DoD bill was seen as a strategic vehicle 
because a legislator who voted against it risked being accused of not supporting U.S. troops in 
Iraq. 
 
Democrats objected to the strategy of including an unrelated and contentious liability measure in 
the DoD appropriations bill. Rep. David Obey (D-Wis.), the senior Democrat on the House 
Appropriations Committee, said conferees were given written assurances that this would not 
happen.13  
 
On Dec. 18, a Sunday, the 38 conferees – 21 Republicans and 17 Democrats – on the 422-page 
DoD appropriations bill gathered in a large Capitol meeting room to finalize reconciliation of 
House and Senate versions of the bill. In addition to funds for the military, the $453 billion 
measure contained some non-military provisions, including authorization for gas and oil 
exploration in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, $29 billion for hurricane relief on the Gulf 
coast, and a 1 percent across-the-board cut in government discretionary spending for fiscal year 
2006. It also included $3.8 billion in emergency funding for avian flu protection, less than the 
$7.1 billion sought by President Bush.14 The measure the conferees considered contained no 
language pertaining to pharmaceutical company liability. 
 
Conferees asked at the meeting whether a liability shield would be in the final version of the bill, 
according to Keith Kennedy, the staff director of the Senate Appropriations Committee. They 
were assured it would not.15 
 
Conference participants, including Obey and Rep. James P. Moran (D-Va.), also reported 
receiving such assurances. 
 
“The conference committee ended its work with the understanding, both verbal and in writing, 
that there would be no legislative liability protection language inserted in this bill,” Obey said.16 
 
Later that same evening, however, according to Obey, Frist went to Hastert and asked him to 
authorize insertion of the liability shield measure into the bill. Frist evidently was in possession 
of a 40-page text that had evolved considerably from the language that BIO had received five 
weeks earlier.  
 
“After the conference was finished at 6 p.m., Senator Frist marched over to the House side of the 
Capitol about four hours later and insisted that over 40 pages of legislation ... that had never been 
seen by conferees be attached to the bill,” Obey said on the House floor. “The speaker joined 
him in that insistence so that without a vote of the conferees, that legislation was unilaterally and 
arrogantly inserted into the bill after the conference was over in a blatantly abusive power play 
by two of the most powerful men in Congress.”17 
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Kennedy, the Senate Appropriations Committee staff director, said a month later. “It was added 
after the conference had concluded. It was added at the specific direction of the speaker of the 
House and the majority leader of the Senate.” Kennedy, speaking at a budget seminar for 
reporters, called the act “an absolute travesty.”18 
 
Democratic conferees were stunned. Moran said he found out about the late-night addition as 
House members were voting on the conference report at 5 a.m. on Monday, December 19.19  
 
“My understanding is that the staff discovered this after the bill was put on the floor,” Moran told 
Public Citizen. “This is a big issue,” he said, likening it to the asbestos legislation now stalled in 
the Senate after years of work. 20 
 
“This should have been properly debated,” he added. 21 
 
Members Object 
Frist and Hastert’s actions drew criticism from both sides of the aisle. 
 
“It was not until the dead of night on this past Sunday, after signatures had already been 
collected on the conference report, that the Republican majority slipped these provisions into the 
bill,” Sen. Robert C. Byrd, the senior Democrat on the Appropriations Committee, told his 
colleagues in a floor speech. “What an insult to the legislative process.”22 
 
While most of the criticism came from Democrats, some prominent Republicans, too, looked 
askance at the maneuver, though in more muted terms. 
 
Hours after Frist’s duplicitous act of legislative misconduct, Rep. Jerry Lewis (R-Calif.), the 
chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, took to the House floor to complain of a 
“tendency for these bills to become Christmas trees for unrelated legislative proposals and for 
spending to grow out of control. This is simply not acceptable”23 
 
It was 4:30 a.m. Monday and the House was preparing to vote on the DoD bill. Lewis’s remarks 
followed those of Obey, who complained about the late insertion of the liability shield and the 
ANWR provision (which was in the bill when conferees considered it less than 12 hours earlier), 
and Rep. Steny Hoyer (D-Md.), the House minority whip, who criticized the last minute 
additions of what he called “very controversial issues.”  
 
Lewis seemed to agree with Hoyer. He said, “At the eleventh hour, controversial legislative 
language has been attached” to the measure. “My fear is this language has the potential to sink 
the entire package once it reaches the Senate.” 
 
He did not specify what he was referring to, but his comments were prescient. When the bill 
reached the Senate, a filibuster forced the removal of the provision to open ANWR to oil and gas 
drilling. 
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Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) was more pointed in his criticism of the liability shield than his 
colleagues in the House. 
 
Saying that he and Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman (D-Conn.) had been working for four years “on 
comprehensive legislation to address this concern,” Hatch told his colleagues during Senate 
debate on the DoD spending bill on Dec. 21 that he had urged Frist not to include the liability 
shield provision in the defense spending measure or any other “must pass vehicle.”24  
 
“This is the type of issue that takes time, money, creative energy and patience,” he said.  
  
He said he would oppose the liability shield measure if it were a standalone bill because of its 
manifest flaws, including the absence of secured funding to compensate victims of drug and 
vaccine injuries, and potential constitutional problems. 
 
By the same token, however, Hatch sharply took his colleagues to task for criticizing drug 
companies, saying “I also think it is way past time that members of this body and others stop 
unjustifiably vilifying the pharmaceutical industry.”  
 
That didn’t persuade Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) 
 
“It was the Republican leadership’s big Christmas present to their friends in the drug industry,” 
he said in a floor speech the next day.25 
 
“This is the second time that this Congress has supinely done the bidding of the pharmaceutical 
industry in the dead of night,” Obey said on the House floor, citing House passage of the 
Medicare drug bill, which was accomplished by a five-vote margin only after House Republican 
leadership held the vote open for three hours – making it the longest vote in House history – 
while arms were twisted.26 
 
Frist Had Tried in the Past 
It was also not the first time Frist had tucked a special favor for drug company friends into 
unrelated legislation. 
 
Frist appears to have been behind the inclusion of a liability shield for Eli Lilly in the Homeland 
Security bill in 2002. The 39 lines of text would have given Lilly immunity from lawsuits over 
injuries caused by its controversial mercury-based vaccine additive thimerosal.27 At the time, 
Frist was chairman of the National Republican Senatorial Committee, for which he raised $4.6 
million from the pharmaceutical industry for the 2002 election, including $459,000 contributed 
by Eli Lilly.28 The company also bought 5,000 copies of a new book Frist had authored, “When 
Every Moment Counts: What You Need to Know About Bioterrorism From the Senate’s Only 
Doctor.” The firm distributed the book to doctors across the country, while Frist donated profits 
from the sale to charity.29 
 
In March 2002, Frist introduced a stand-alone bill that protected the drug maker from lawsuits 
alleging that thimerosal had caused autism in children who received vaccines containing the 
preservative.30 That bill would have required dismissal of thousands of pending court cases and 
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prohibited future lawsuits against Lilly in return for allowing claimants to seek damages from the 
no-fault National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (NVICP).31 Claimants who prevail in 
that process are compensated out of a $2.2 billion trust fund financed by a surcharge on each 
dose of vaccine.32  
 
But because the 1986 law applied only to the vaccines themselves and not additives, Lilly could 
still be sued over thimerosal. The Frist legislation aimed to close this loophole.33  
 
After the Frist bill stalled, nearly the exact wording of the provision was inconspicuously 
inserted at the end of the 475-page bill creating the Department of Homeland Security. The bill 
was signed by President George W. Bush in November 2002, the month before Frist became 
majority leader. However, belated discovery of the provision provoked such an outcry by parents 
claiming that thimerosal was responsible for their children’s autism that Congress stripped the 
provision from the law in February 2003.34 
 
The New York Times reported, “One aide said the language mysteriously appeared in the House 
version of the bill in entirely different type than the rest of the measure, as though someone had 
clipped it out of Mr. Frist’s legislation and simply pasted it in.”35 
 
Then-House Majority Leader Dick Armey (R-Texas) took responsibility for inserting the Frist 
legislation in the bill, his spokesman, Richard Diamond, said.36 Nevertheless, Frist was widely 
suspected of being behind the move. 
 
Diamond would not say who inserted the language. “If you want to give somebody credit for it, 
Mr. Armey takes ultimate credit. It’s his bill. We are happy to wrap ourselves around it, but Mr. 
Armey is not a doctor, like Senator Frist. He’s the source of the language.”37 
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Section III: The Morning After: Industry Celebrates 
 
 
“The bill includes provisions that will greatly reduce the risk of frivolous lawsuits and minimize litigation 
burdens, while ensuring that bad conduct by manufacturers or others is appropriately punished through 
both government enforcement action and private civil lawsuits for damages.” 
– Dave W. Boyer, BIO Director of Federal Government 
Relations, discussing BIO’s “Talking Points” on the DoD 
pandemic drug provision, Dec. 19, 2005. 
 
Frist furnished the pharmaceutical industry with extraordinary protections that exceeded all 
previous proposals – including those made by the Bush administration. The law exempted drug 
makers from liability entirely during a health emergency, making an exception only for injuries 
caused by “willful misconduct.” Furthermore, even in cases of “willful misconduct,” the law 
erected an array of statutory obstacles to filing a lawsuit.  
  
“It is hard to imagine a successful willful misconduct action under the law,” Duke University 
School of Law Professor Erwin Chemerinsky told Public Citizen.38 Chemerinsky, a 
constitutional law expert, submitted an analysis of the bill to Congress in December that 
questioned the constitutionality of numerous provisions.39 
 
BIO had also sought a different form of legal protection in the event of a lawsuit, according to 
Tom DiLenge, the organization’s deputy general counsel and acting general counsel.40 BIO 
wanted plaintiffs restricted to filing suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which 
permits lawsuits against employees or agents of the government if the government grants a 
limited waiver of its immunity. The FTCA does not provide for jury trials. It also allows for 
defenses that would guarantee that a drug company would not likely have to defend the claims of 
an injured plaintiff in court. BIO was justified in seeking these terms, said DiLenge, because the 
government would be the pharmaceutical industry’s “partner” in dealing with a pandemic or 
other health emergency. 
 
“We’re not making these products because they’re going to make a lot of money,” he said in an 
interview with Public Citizen. “We’re making them because the government wants them.”41 
 
Drug companies that make vaccines and other products to combat pandemic diseases may be 
performing a service to the government, but that does not mean there are not substantial rewards. 
Back in 2001, the tiny British biotech firm Acambis and its U.S. partner Baxter International beat 
out Merck and Glaxo for a $428 million smallpox vaccine contract at what the company 
estimated would be a 30 percent to 40 percent profit margin. At the time, Acambis did not even 
have a product on the market and had never made a profit.42 BioPort Corp., sole maker of the 
anthrax vaccine, was transformed by $450 million in government contracts over seven years 
from a $4.5 million start-up to a biotech behemoth, splurging on $100 million buy outs of other 
drug companies and a manufacturing expansion in 2005.43 Gilead Sciences, the company that 
developed the antiviral flu treatment Tamiflu, saw its stock price surge 25 percent in six months 
largely due to sales of the drug sparked by fears of avian flu in the latter half of 2005.44 
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The following are the major provisions of the law that industry fought for and won – at great risk 
to the general public. 
 
The Liability Shield Confers Virtually Complete Immunity from Lawsuits  
The law creates an expansive liability shield that acts as a “bar on all state and federal claims for 
loss arising out of the use of a covered countermeasure pursuant to a secretarial declaration [of a 
health emergency] except for a new federal cause of action for willful misconduct proximately 
causing serious physical injury or death,” BIO Deputy General Counsel Tom DiLenge wrote 
hours after Frist’s midnight gambit.45 The shield extends to all companies, state officials, 
healthcare workers and others involved in combating a health emergency or potential health 
emergency. It encompasses all aspects of drug, vaccine and medical device production and 
delivery, including design, development, testing, manufacture, labeling, distribution, 
formulation, packaging, marketing, promotion, sale, purchase, donation, dispensing, prescribing, 
administration, licensing, or use.  
 
Frist’s gift to the drug industry far exceeded the scope of the Bush administration’s proposal, 
which would have applied the shield only to drugs and vaccines created specifically to combat 
the avian flu.46 Instead, as BIO Deputy General Counsel DiLenge explained in an analysis 
prepared for the group’s members subsequent to passage of the bill, “Definition of covered 
countermeasure is broad – includes any qualified pandemic or epidemic product, any security 
countermeasure (BioShield), and any product authorized for emergency use under Section 564 of 
[the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act].”47 This provision of the FFDCA allows the 
secretary of HHS to authorize emergency use of unapproved products or use of approved 
products for unapproved uses. 
 
The open-ended definition of a covered countermeasure means that it could apply to a long-used 
drug to which a patient experiences an adverse reaction, or one that causes injury because it 
comes from a contaminated batch. If that drug were taken to treat a condition related to a health 
emergency declared by the HHS secretary, the liability shield would kick in. 
 
Hatch identified this problem in his Dec. 21 remarks on the Senate floor. “In the case of dual use 
products,” he told his colleagues, “such as antibiotics, it appears that, should a bad batch of drugs 
be made due to ordinary negligence, a patient injured when taking the product for a normal, 
garden-variety infection will have a much greater range of legal remedies than a person who took 
a pill from the same adulterated production batch but under a secretarial declaration of a public 
health remedy.”48 
 
Moreover, the law creates a rebuttable presumption that, during a declared emergency, use of a 
covered drug is to treat the emergency condition. A patient injured by a dual use drug that he or 
she took for a condition other than the health emergency has the burden of proving that it was not 
taken to treat the emergency condition. 
 
“Willful Misconduct” – The Exception to the Shield 
BIO’s major preoccupation throughout drafting was making sure that the “sole exception” to 
legal immunity applied only in the most remote of circumstances – where an injured party can 
show by “clear and convincing evidence,” a heightened standard of proof, that a defendant’s 
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“willful misconduct” caused serious injury or death. The key was the definition of “willful 
misconduct” – more specifically, ensuring that it did not encompass “gross negligence” or “gross 
recklessness,” but only “intentional, voluntary and conscious actions, or failures to act, 
undertaken to achieve a wrongful purpose.”  
 
Frist was assiduously responsive to industry’s concern. The law defines “willful misconduct” as 
“an act or omission that is taken intentionally to achieve a wrongful purpose; knowingly without 
legal or factual justification; and in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so great as to 
make it highly probable that the harm will outweigh the benefit.” To leave no room for 
ambiguity, the law adds a rule making it clear that willful misconduct “shall be construed as 
establishing a standard for liability that is more stringent than a standard of negligence in any 
form or recklessness.” 
 
Here is an example to illustrate the difference between “willful misconduct” and “gross 
negligence” or “gross recklessness.” 
 
• Gross recklessness or gross negligence: A man walks into a room with a loaded semi-
automatic pistol and in showing it off to friends, he twirls it on his forefinger. It goes off, 
killing someone. 
 
• Willful misconduct under the statute: A man walks into a room with a loaded semi-
automatic pistol and in showing it off to friends, he twirls it on his forefinger. He then 
points it at someone and shoots him in the head, killing him. 
 
“That’s a very good analogy,” Chemerinsky said in an e-mail to Public Citizen.  
“Obviously, they were trying for a formulation that would make it very difficult for them ever to 
be sued.”49 
 
But the exceedingly narrow definition of willful misconduct was not enough security for the drug 
industry. For good measure, the law adds mitigating factors that make the possibility of a 
defendant being found guilty of willful misconduct extremely remote. 
 
• The secretary of HHS and the attorney general are instructed to “promulgate regulations 
… that further restrict the scope of actions or omissions … that may qualify as ‘willful 
misconduct.’” 
 
• For the manufacturers and distributors of drugs, the law says there can be no willful 
misconduct for acts or omissions subject to FDA regulation unless the FDA or the 
Department of Justice has taken enforcement action against the company. 
 
This suggests that either the secretary of HHS (which oversees the FDA) or the attorney 
general could prevent a court from a finding of “willful misconduct” simply by refusing 
to investigate or ending a probe without a finding of culpability. This raises constitutional 
red flags with legal scholar Chemerinsky. This “unfettered and unreviewable discretion 
… violates the constitutional guarantee of access to justice, secured under both the First 
Amendment’s Petition Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause,” he wrote 
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in a letter to Congress. “The Supreme Court has recognized that official inaction cannot 
prevent a claimant from being able to go forth with a legitimate lawsuit.”50  
 
• As for state and local authorities and other personnel involved in treating a health 
emergency, the law provides a different but equally imposing shield. It says that “as a 
matter of law” there can be no willful misconduct on their part if they “acted consistent 
with applicable directions, guidelines, or recommendations by the [HHS] secretary” 
regarding the health emergency – as long as HHS or a state or local health authority was 
notified of an injury or death within a week after the defendant learned of it. 
 
This provision suggests that a defendant who learns of a death or injury caused by an 
intentional act can completely avoid liability by reporting the incident to the authorities 
and then convincing the court that it was a matter of just following orders. 
 
An Emergency Declaration is Not Subject to Judicial Review 
“The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that the preclusion of all judicial review raises 
‘serious questions’ concerning separation of powers and due process of law.” 
– Letter of Professor Erwin Chemerinsky to the U.S. Senate, 
Dec. 20, 2005 
 
Although the secretary of HHS has sole discretion to issue a declaration of emergency at any 
time – for any reason, for any duration, and under any circumstance – that declaration may not 
be challenged in a court of law. Indeed, the language of the provision is so broad that it 
empowers the secretary to declare an emergency when he or she deems that a disease or 
condition constitutes not merely a present, but a future risk. In the past, the bar on judicial review 
has led to what some have described as an abuse of power. They cite actions taken by former 
HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson in 2005 with regard to anthrax. 
 
Thompson, responding to a request from the Pentagon, declared an anthrax emergency under the 
Bioshield Act of 2004, a declaration that critics claim was aimed at thwarting a court order.51 
The declaration permitted the military to continue administering anthrax vaccinations to troops 
after a U.S. District Court judge in the District of Columbia had issued an injunction to halt the 
six-year-old Department of Defense “Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program.”52 The judge had 
enjoined further inoculations after finding that the FDA had never given final approval to the 
vaccine, although it had been in use for years. (Indeed, the product was so widely distrusted that 
back in 2001, after the anthrax scare closed the Capitol mailroom and several offices, Frist 
cautioned his staff against taking this same vaccine because of potential adverse effects.53) 
 
Shortly thereafter, the FDA approved the vaccine, ending the need for Thompson’s emergency 
declaration. “Because [FDA] action removed the basis and need for” the emergency declaration, 
“it will not be necessary for DoD to seek renewal … for use of anthrax vaccine to prevent 
inhalation anthrax,” William Winkenwerder Jr., assistant secretary of defense, wrote in a 
memorandum to military surgeons general.”54  
  
Critics have pointed to this sequence of events as confirmation that the emergency had been 
declared solely to get around the court’s injunction. 
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“This emergency was declared to circumvent a federal court injunction against the Pentagon 
ordering that military personnel be given the right to informed consent prior to be administered 
the improperly licensed, experimental Bioport anthrax vaccine,” Barbara Loe Fisher, president of 
the National Vaccine Information Center, wrote to a Senate aide in November.55 
 
Emergency Declarations Preempt State Law 
A declaration of an emergency by the secretary of HHS would automatically trigger preemption 
of relevant state laws. Thus, during an emergency, states may not adopt new laws or enforce 
existing laws that conflict with the statute or relate in any way to any vaccine or drug or other 
countermeasure involved in the declaration. That means that state laws prohibiting 
administration of thimerosal-containing vaccines to pregnant women or infants, for example, 
would be unenforceable in the event of an emergency declaration that covered such a vaccine.56 
State laws requiring that high-risk patients give informed consent before receiving a vaccine 
would be unenforceable. Any individuals injured as a consequence would be barred from 
pursuing a lawsuit for compensation. 
 
A “Process Fund” With No Money In It 
“The legislation provides generous compensation to those injured by administration of 
countermeasures.” 
– Dave W. Boyer, BIO director of federal government 
relations, discussing BIO’s “Talking Points” on the DoD 
pandemic drug provision, Dec. 19, 2005. 
 
“Perhaps the cruelest feature of this infamous provision is that it includes a sham compensation program 
with no funding” 
– Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), referring to the liability 
shield measure during Senate debate on the emergency 
supplemental appropriations bill, May 1, 2006. 
 
 
An emergency declaration by the secretary of HHS triggers establishment of a “Covered 
Countermeasure Process Fund” to provide “timely, uniform and adequate compensation to 
eligible individuals for covered injuries directly caused by the administration or use of a covered 
countermeasure pursuant to such declaration.” 
 
But this is a fund in name only. There is no budgetary allocation and no designated source of 
money. Instead, funding is available only if Congress approves an emergency appropriation 
under the 2006 Congressional Budget Resolution that, in any event, “shall remain in effect 
through October 1, 2006.” The illusory fund provides meager benefits for injured people: 1) the 
uninsured cost of medical products and services that the secretary of HHS deems effective, 2) 
two-thirds of lost income, minus any income benefits the victims may be due from other sources 
(e.g., workers compensation, short-term disability, Social Security disability, etc.), with an 
annual income cap of $50,000 and total lifetime cap of $250,000, and 3) a death benefit of up to 
$250,000. Of course, even this meager level of compensation is available only if there are funds, 
and then only for injuries appearing on an HHS-established table, not subject to judicial review, 
that are “presumed to be directly caused” by the covered drugs or vaccines during the relevant 
time period.57 
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Even Hatch expressed skepticism about the “process fund” during the Dec. 21 floor debate 
leading up to the vote. “Many will question whether this bill, in its current form, contains too 
much indemnification and not enough compensation,” he said. “This is a fair question … I 
cannot say that I would recommend such an important program to be subject to the uncertainties 
of less than stable, certain funding.”58 
 
HHS will decide who is awarded compensation “based on compelling, reliable, valid, medical 
and scientific evidence,” and on a table that details injuries “presumed to be directly caused” by 
the covered drugs or vaccines and time period when the first symptom must occur for the 
presumption to apply. The law prohibits judicial review of the injury table. 
 
In its “talking points” for a “communications call” on the day after its victory, BIO painted a far 
rosier picture of the empty fund: “The legislation provides generous compensation to those … 
individuals who are injured through the administration or use of products that are specifically 
designed to diagnose, mitigate or treat a pandemic or epidemic or other public health 
emergency,” Boyer wrote. “The compensation program provides for all reasonable and necessary 
medical expenses, lost employment income and a death benefit equal to given to [sic] policemen 
and firefighters killed in the line of duty.”59 
 
High hurdles make it difficult to get to court even when there is willful misconduct 
Getting to court is nearly impossible. And, if a plaintiff ever gets there, he or she will face 
numerous obstacles. 
 
• Do not pass Go – Start at the Process Fund 
Before pursuing a willful misconduct claim, injured parties must first apply for 
compensation from the Process Fund – provided that it is operable. After 240 days, a 
plaintiff can pursue a lawsuit if the Fund has not acted on the claim. A plaintiff who gets 
a favorable decision from the Fund must choose between accepting the compensation 
offered or taking a chance in court. 
 
• Suits may only be filed in D.C. Federal Court, regardless of where the plaintiff lives 
To avoid inconveniencing BIO members who objected to having to defend lawsuits 
across the country, the law establishes sole jurisdiction in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia. A three-judge screening panel hears pre-trial motions, and those 
cases deemed meritorious are assigned to a single judge. Defendants can appeal when 
they lose motions asserting legal immunity or FDA regulatory exclusivity. Plaintiffs must 
cope with the need to travel long distances and with delaying tactics afforded by the 
appeals process. 
 
• Pleading with particularity, limited discovery, heightened standard of proof stack 
the deck against plaintiffs 
Unlike ordinary civil complaints, the lawsuits filed in these cases must detail, at the time 
of filing, the specific acts or omissions constituting willful misconduct and provide facts 
supporting the contention that they are the proximate cause of plaintiff’s serious physical 
injury or death. Moreover, a medical expert must attest to the diagnosis and causation. 
Discovery – the process of each side exchanging information before trial – is prohibited 
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prior to motions to dismiss, and is generally restricted. That leaves plaintiffs at an 
extreme disadvantage because evidence needed to prove misconduct is often under the 
defendant’s control. If a defendant cannot be compelled to produce the evidence, the 
plaintiff may well lack grounds to go forward. Proof of willful misconduct must be 
shown by “clear and convincing” evidence, rather than the “preponderance of the 
evidence” standard that is typical in civil matters. 
 
• Even plaintiffs who prevail risk compensation reductions 
 If the plaintiff wins the case, both economic and non-economic damage awards may be 
reduced. Economic damage awards will be reduced by a plaintiff’s collateral source 
benefits – amounts received from third parties such as workers compensation, insurance 
policies, entitlement programs, etc. That makes the defendant that is responsible for the 
injury a secondary payer. Then, any non-economic damage award will be proportionately 
adjusted to correspond to the percentage of responsibility of a defendant for the harm to 
the plaintiff. 
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Section IV: Consumers Mourn 
 
 
Conferring a cloak of immunity on the drug industry comes with a hefty price tag. After all, 
when people are killed or injured, someone has to pay for medical care, lost productivity, the 
needs of families deprived of breadwinners. And pandemic drugs and vaccines are certain to 
cause injuries, as industry itself has acknowledged. In response to the initial draft liability 
legislation it received, BIO said, “Drugs authorized for emergency use must only pass a 
risk/benefit analysis (that is, the benefits outweigh the risks), and likely will not have been tested 
on humans for safety or efficacy prior to use … We also know, in some cases that there are 
dangerous side effects that will in fact occur in some portion of the population (for ex, the 
smallpox vaccine).”60 Indeed, the smallpox vaccine has been blamed for heart attacks, increased 
risk of heart inflammation and neurological disorders among first responders.61 The anthrax 
vaccine, some batches of which have been found to contain squalene, a chemical associated with 
Gulf War syndrome, has been implicated in neurological disorders among military personnel.62 
Sanofi Pasteur’s meningitis vaccine is currently under FDA investigation for its connection to at 
least five cases of Guillain-Barre paralysis.63 
 
There are a number of examples in law where insulating corporations from liability has been 
found to serve the public interest, often because it is necessary to ensure the provision of some 
vital product or service that would otherwise not be available.64 Under such circumstances, the 
government may stand in the corporation’s place for the purpose of defending and compensating 
injury claims, which are filed under the Federal Tort Claims Act.65 Alternatively, an 
administrative mechanism backed up with a designated funding source might be established to 
handle claims and provide relief. Such arrangements are consistent with the constitutional 
mandate of establishing a just, adequate quid pro quo when an individual is deprived of the right 
to go to court. 
 
A less-heralded mechanism used to exempt companies from some measure of liability without 
forcing injured consumers to relinquish any rights is indemnification, which has existed under 
current law for 50-odd years.  This mechanism was called into play by HHS in the weeks before 
Frist’s legislative coup d’etat in the avian flu vaccine contracts totaling $162.5 million that it 
signed with two drug companies, Sanofi-Aventis and Chiron.  The Sanofi-Aventis contract, for 
example, provides for indemnification by the federal government under Public Law 85-804 as a 
condition of administering the vaccine to humans.  The statute permits indemnification of a 
contractor engaged in an activity important to national security that involves “unusually 
hazardous risks,” where insurance is not sufficient to cover those risks, for the amount of 
damages and litigation expenses that exceed the contractor’s insurance coverage.  In addition, 
Sanofi’s contract requires HHS to help the company explain to the public why it needs a liability 
shield and what the government is doing about it. 
 
While indemnification under the statute ensured limited financial relief, it still left companies 
facing the specter of a jury trial, which could be always turn into a public relations nightmare. 
Industry really wanted to get as close to full immunity from liability as possible, and ensure that 
a compensation program was set up to short-circuit outraged sympathy for drug injury victims 
that might pose the threat of commercial or political backlash. 
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Frist gave the companies immunity, but then went still further and stripped victims of 
meaningful recourse. In this regard, the bill was a drastic departure from precedent, shielding 
corporations from legal and financial accountability, but failing to replace them with a 
government surrogate or establish a guaranteed source of funds to cover losses. The recipients of 
pandemic products, their families, and society at large would be forced to shoulder the 
consequences of industry’s gross negligence, recklessness, deceptive claims, and failure to warn, 
among other egregious acts. Had such a law been in place during the 1976 swine flu scare, none 
of the 4,000 people who claimed injury from the vaccine, including over 500 who developed a 
paralyzing nerve disorder and some 35 who died, would have been able to get compensation for 
medical expenses, income replacement, long-term care or other needs.66 
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Section V: Big Pharma’s Big Sway 
 
 
Drug makers have long been among the most generous contributors to members of Congress and 
among the biggest financers of lobbyists to bend those members’ ears. The debate over a liability 
shield for pandemic countermeasures was no exception. 
 
Campaign Contributions 
The three lawmakers who were most responsible for Frist’s assault on consumers’ safety and 
rights were Sen. Richard Burr (R-N.C.), who drafted a liability shield bill that served as a 
predecessor to the text Frist dropped into the DoD appropriations bill; Hastert, who enabled Frist 
to make his move; and Frist, who inserted the legislation. 
 
These three members of Congress enjoy a special relationship with drug makers. Each ranks in 
the top 10 among current members of Congress in contributions received from pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and the biotechnology industry since the 2000 election cycle. [See Figure 1] And 
Frist has felt the pharmaceutical industry’s generosity in others ways. In 2002, while Frist was 
head of the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC), the committee raised $4.6 
million from the pharmaceutical industry. Only one other industry – securities and investments – 
exceeded the pharmaceutical industry’s contributions to the NRSC. Frist’s success in raising 
money for the NRSC helped the Republicans capture control of the Senate in 2002 and was 
widely viewed as a chief reason he was tapped to become Senate majority leader with barely 
more than a single term of service under his belt.67 
 
Figure 1: Campaign Contributions Received from the Pharmaceutical 
and Biotech Industries Since the 2000 Election Cycle 
Member of Congress Total Contributions* Rank ** 
Dennis Hastert $465,200 3 
Richard Burr $414,188 4 
Bill Frist $332,207 9 
Total $1,211,595 -- 
* Includes contributions to campaign accounts and to leadership PACs. 
** Rank refers to the sum of contributions received from the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industries since the 2000 election cycle compared to all members of the 
109th Congress. 
 
Lobbying  
With an influence-peddling tab of $758 million since 1998, more than any other industry, the 
drug industry has never failed to make sure its voice was heard on issues it cared about – and the 
companies that cared deeply about vaccines and other pandemic countermeasures were no 
exception.68 In 2004 and 2005, the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries deployed a 
platoon of at least 158 lobbyists to press their causes on these issues.69 
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Twelve firms and two trade associations that lobbied on vaccines and other pandemic-related 
issues in 2004 and 2005 spent at least $90.8 million to lobby Congress and the executive branch 
on a wide variety of issues in those years. [See Figure 2]  
 
Figure 2: Lobbying Expenditures of Drug Makers that Lobbied 
on Vaccines or Pandemic Issues, 2004-2005 
Organization Total* 
Bayer $4,680,000 
Biotechnology Industry Organization $11,000,000 
Chiron Corporation $5,864,758 
Genaco Biomedical $20,000 
GlaxoSmithKline $9,760,000 
Hoffmann-La Roche $4,605,114 
Hollis Eden Pharmaceuticals $380,000 
Johnson and Johnson $4,780,000 
MedImmune Inc. $440,000 
Merck $210,000 
Pfizer $12,250,000 
Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) $29,000,000 
Sanofi Pasteur $2,000,000 
Wyeth $5,840,000 
Total $90,829,872 
Source: Public Citizen analysis of lobbying disclosure records filed with the secretary of 
the Senate. Only semi-annual periods in which organizations reported lobbying on 
vaccines or pandemic-related matters were included. 
 
Revolving Doors 
In its pursuit of a liability shield, the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries drew on a 
cadre of well-placed lobbyists with previous government employment. They included two former 
top health care aides to Frist, a former House staffer who had helped draft language for a 2004 
law that served as a predecessor to Frist’s liability shield provision, and the son of the speaker of 
the House. 
 
These revolving-door lobbyists were not the exception to the rule. The companies and their trade 
associations paid for at least 84 former federal employees-turned-lobbyists to lobby Capitol Hill, 
the White House and other executive branch agencies on vaccine issues and other pandemic 
issues in 2004 and 2005. These lobbyists included seven former members of Congress. [See 
Figure 3] [The full list of revolving-door lobbyists is furnished in Appendix A] 
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Figure 3: Former Members of Congress Who Lobbied on Vaccines or 
Pandemic Issues, 2004-2005 
Member Client Firm Service in Congress 
Dale Bumpers Sanofi Pasteur Arent Fox Kintner; Plotkin and Kahn U.S. Sen. (D-Ark.), 1975-1998 
Dennis DeConcini Chiron Corp. Parry, Romani, DeConcini and Symms U.S. Sen. (D-Ariz.), 1977-1994 
Vic Fazio Chiron Corp. Clark and Weinstock U.S. Rep. (D-Calif.), 1979-1998 
Jack Fields Sanofi Pasteur Twenty-First Century Group U.S. Rep. (R-Texas), 1981-1996 
Paul Rogers Biotechnology Industry Organization Hogan and Hartson U.S. Rep. (D-Fla.), 1955-1978 
Steve Symms Chiron Corp. Parry, Romani, DeConcini and Symms 
U.S. Rep. (R-Idaho), 1973-1980; 
U.S. Sen. (R-Idaho), 1981-1992 
Vin Weber Chiron Corp. Clark and Weinstock U.S. Rep. (R-Minn.), 1981-1992 
Source: Public Citizen analysis of lobbying disclosure records filed with the secretary of the Senate. 
 
In particular, there were three groups of lobbyists who were strategically positioned to aid their 
cause: those who migrated from Congress or the executive branch to influential positions at BIO, 
those with ties to Frist and those with ties to Hastert. 
 
BIO’s Point People Came from Influential Government Positions 
• Dave W. Boyer, the chief lobbyist for BIO when the liability shield measure was written, 
had served as a congressional liaison at HHS and a special assistant to the HHS 
secretary.70 In the run-up to Frist’s covert insertion, Boyer served as an industry point of 
contact for the White House and the Hill, according to e-mails obtained by Public 
Citizen. He was furnished with an initial draft that the congressional leadership used as a 
jumping off point in drafting a liability shield. Boyer promptly forwarded this language to 
an undisclosed e-mail list and to employees of BIO. “Please send me your company’s 
comments,” he wrote. In the ensuing week, Boyer had a meeting at the White House and 
another, at the invitation of a Frist aide, with Frist’s staff and representatives of the White 
House, the Justice Department and the Department of Health and Human Services. Both 
meetings were to “discuss liability,” Boyer wrote in e-mails. 
 
Boyer continues to spin through the revolving door. The FDA announced on March 15, 
2006 that Boyer had been named the agency’s assistant commissioner for legislation. The 
press release announcing his appointment said, “Most recently, Boyer worked closely 
with members of Congress as the director of federal government relations for the 
Biotechnology Industry Organization.”71 
 
• Tom DiLenge may represent the ultimate revolving-door insider. In 2004, as policy 
director and chief counsel for the House Homeland Security Committee, DiLenge “was 
called upon … to lead the effort to draft and enact President Bush’s signature initiative to 
combat bioterrorism, the Project BioShield Act,” Rep. Peter T. King (R-N.Y.) said in an 
effusive tribute to DiLenge printed in the November 1, 2005 Congressional Record. 72  
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DiLenge, a veteran of nine years on Capitol Hill, was leaving to become deputy general 
counsel of BIO, where he promptly got involved in helping Capitol Hill staffers draft the 
liability shield language that Frist inserted into the DoD Appropriations bill on Dec. 18 of 
that year. 
 
Documents obtained by Public Citizen show that DiLenge was one of the BIO officials 
who received a copy of an early draft of the legislation that was sent to BIO for 
comment.73 He was one of the BIO representatives at two key meetings in which the bill 
was discussed, a Nov. 15, 2005 session at the White House and a session with Frist staff 
members and administration officials on November 18.74 
 
On the morning after Frist’s covert insertion of the measure into the DoD conference 
report, DiLenge authored a three-page document titled “Key aspects of the final 
countermeasure liability and compensation program.” The paper was circulated by Boyer 
less than 12 hours after Frist’s insertion.75 
 
Former Frist Aides Who Turned Lobbyists 
• Dave Larson was Frist’s senior health policy advisor from 1995 to 2001, before the 
senator’s ascent to majority leader. Larson advised Frist, then chairman of the Public 
Health Subcommittee, on a variety of issues including “food and drug law,” according to 
the biography on his firm’s Web site.76 
 
In 2005, Larson lobbied on vaccine issues for Sanofi Pasteur, Hollis Eden 
Pharmaceuticals and Genaco Biomedical.77 Genaco says it offers a diagnostic test that 
can detect avian flu in four hours, while most tests take up to two days.78 
 
Larson also lobbies for other pharmaceutical companies, including Bayer Healthcare, 
Wyeth and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, the trade group 
headed by former Rep. Billy Tauzin (R-La.) 
 
• Dean Rosen left Frist’s staff, where he was health policy director, late in 2005 to join the 
firm of Mehlman Vogel Castagenetti Inc., where, in November, he became a lobbyist for 
Merck, concerned about vaccines, among other issues.79 
  
• Lee Rawls was Frist’s chief of staff from March 2003 until March 2005. Rawls began 
lobbying for Schering-Plough on issues not related to vaccines and pandemics the month 
he left Frist’s staff.80 
 
The Hastert Connection 
• The son of the Speaker. While many members of Hastert’s staff have graduated to K 
Street, the most significant connection between the speaker and the Washington influence 
peddling community is reflected in the work of his 30-year-old son, Joshua Hastert. 
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In the first half of 2005, Podesta Mattoon’s Hastert lobbied on behalf of vaccine maker 
Chiron on “avian flu issues” and at least two vaccine-related bills. Each bill would have 
provided a liability shield for drug makers.81 
 
 “Josh has long-standing relationships with numerous offices on Capitol Hill and in the 
Administration as well as a unique understanding of the legislative process,” Podesta 
Mattoon’s Web site oozes about the younger Hastert.  
 
In 2002, the New York Times wrote that this Hastert has “a pierced tongue, a goatee and 
owns a record label called ‘Seven Dead Arson.’”82 
 
• Peter Jeffries, a former senior adviser to and spokesman for Hastert, registered in 
November 2005 to lobby on behalf of BIO. He is employed by Hill and Knowlton.83 
 
• Darren Willcox, a former senior policy advisor to Hastert, was the speaker’s “point 
person on all health care and Social Security issues” for three-and-a-half years, according 
to his biography on the Dutko Worldwide Web site. Willcox lobbies for several 
pharmaceutical firms including GlaxoSmithKline.84 
 
In May 2002, while Willcox still worked on the Hill, Glaxo paid $2,817 for him to take a 
six-day “educational staff trip on vaccine issues” to Brussels, Belgium, according to a 
travel form Willcox filed with the House.85 
 
• David Thompson, a former Hastert assistant on policy issues, works for Capitol Hill 
Consulting Group and has lobbied for Novartis, Abbott Laboratories, DFB 
Pharmaceuticals and Millennium Pharmaceuticals.86 
 
• Jack Howard A former deputy chief of staff to Hastert and former Senate Majority 
Leader Trent Lott, Howard was also Deputy Assistant for Legislative Affairs to President 
George W. Bush for two years.87 At Wexler and Walker Public Policy Associates, he 
lobbied on legislation that would have provided Medicare coverage for self-injected 
biologicals that replace drugs that cannot be self-administered.88 
 
• Amy Jensen Cuniffee lobbies for Bristol-Myers, Aventis-Pasteur and Genentech at 
Quinn Gillespie and Associates.89 Before joining Quinn Gillespie in May 2005, she 
worked at the White House legislative office. Earlier, she spent seven years as an aide to 
Hastert and former Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-Texas.)90  
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Section VI: BIO’s Deceptive Reach 
 
 
BIO underplays its link to giant pharmaceutical companies, preferring instead to emphasize its 
role in helping a fledgling industry. This is how the organization describes itself in press 
releases: “BIO represents more than 1,100 biotechnology companies, academic institutions, state 
biotechnology centers and related organizations across the United States and 31 other nations. 
BIO members are involved in the research and development of healthcare, agricultural, industrial 
and environmental biotechnology products”91 
 
What BIO’s biography doesn’t say is that its membership is stacked with the nation’s biggest 
pharmaceutical firms. Indeed, the top 10 firms in terms of U.S. pharmaceutical sales are 
members. Together, these companies control more than half of the U.S. pharmaceutical market. 
[See Figure 4] 
 
Figure 4: BIO’s Biggest Members 
Rank Corporation Total Sales 2005 (in billions) Pct. Market Share 
1 Pfizer $27.2 10.8 
2 GlaxoSmithKline $19.9 7.9 
3 Johnson and Johnson $16.0 6.3 
4 Merck and Co. $15.2 6.0 
5 AstraZeneca $12.9 5.1 
6 Novartis $12.3 4.9 
7 Amgen $11.9 4.7 
8 Sanofi-Aventis $11.0 4.4 
9 Lilly $8.7 3.4 
10 Bristol-Myers Squibb $8.4 3.3 
Total  $143.5 56.8 
Sources: IMS Health Web site and BIO membership directory, as listed on its Web site. 
 
It wasn’t always thus. 
 
BIO was formed in July 1993 from the merger of two small Washington-based biotech 
organizations, the Industrial Biotechnology Association (which mainly represented larger, 
established companies before Congress and federal agencies) and the Association of 
Biotechnology Companies (which represented emerging companies and universities). At its 
formation, BIO had 16 employees and a budget of $2.1 million.92 Its first president was Carl 
Feldbaum, who had come to Washington in 1973 as an assistant Watergate special prosecutor 
and remained in the capital. He had served as an assistant secretary of energy, inspector general 
for defense intelligence at the Defense Department and chief of staff to Sen. Arlen Specter (R-
Pa.)93 
 
BIO had grown to almost 100 staffers with a $40 million budget by the time Feldbaum retired in 
2004. Its membership roster had grown from 350 to more than 1,100.94 
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Feldbaum worked at making the organization a player in Washington’s influence-peddling 
world. Between 1998, the earliest year for which lobbying disclosure forms are available online, 
and the end of 2004, BIO more than tripled its lobbying budget, from $1.7 million to $5.2 
million.95  
 
After Feldbaum retired at the end of 2004, BIO took another step toward making itself a force. 
The group hired a Capitol Hill veteran, former Rep. Jim Greenwood (R-Pa.), as its new 
president. Greenwood was a six-term congressman who had headed the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.96 
 
In Greenwood’s first year, he presided over a 12.4 percent increase in the group’s lobbying 
expenditures, to $5.8 million. Greenwood also used the Capitol’s revolving door to increase 
BIO’s firepower. On the same day in April 2005, for example, Greenwood announced that the 
group had filled four senior staff positions with veterans of Capitol Hill or the federal 
bureaucracy. They were: 
 
• Scott Whitaker, BIO’s chief of staff. He was formerly chief of staff and chief lobbyist for 
HHS and a staff member of former Senate Assistant Majority Leader Don Nickles (R-
Okla.)97 
 
• Amit K. Sachdev, BIO’s executive vice president for health, moved to BIO from the 
FDA, where he was deputy commissioner for policy. Sachdev also worked on Capitol 
Hill as majority counsel for the House Energy and Commerce Committee.98 
 
• Brent A. Del Monte, who was named BIO vice president for federal government 
relations. Del Monte was formerly counsel to the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee and legislative director for former Rep. Tom Bliley (R-Va.) He worked for 
Washington Council Ernst and Young most recently before arriving at BIO.99 
 
• Alan F. Eisenberg, who was named executive vice president, advocacy and operations, 
previously worked on Greenwood’s congressional staff, and as a staffer for the Public 
Health Subcommittee of the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, 
and as an aide to Rep John Shadegg (R-Ariz.)100  
 
Greenwood has hired other veterans of the Hill and federal bureaucracy at other times, including 
two BIO officials who played key roles in crafting the liability shield to their organization’s 
liking. In March 2006, the FDA announced Boyer’s appointment as the agency’s assistant 
commissioner for legislation.101 
 
BIO also hired Tom DiLenge, who was credited by Rep. Peter T. King (R.-N.Y.) with being a 
major author of the BioShield Act of 2004, the predecessor to the liability shield.102 
 
Greenwood seems fond of flattering members of Congress with “Legislator of the Year” awards. 
For example, over a two-day period in March 2005, BIO bestowed “BIO Legislator of the Year” 
honors to two senators and six House members. They were Sen. Richard Burr (R-N.C.), Sen. 
Mike Crapo (R-Idaho), Rep. Bobby Rush (D-Ill.), Rep John M. Shimkus (R-Ill.), Rep. Rush Holt 
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(D-N.J.) Rep. Sam Graves (R-Mo.), Rep. Diana DeGette (D-Colo.), and Rep. Melissa A. Hart 
(R-Pa.)103 
 
But Greenwood wasn’t finished. 
 
A month later, he rounded out the BIO Baker’s Dozen, by showering the award on five more 
lawmakers: Sen. Saxby Chambliss (R-Ga.), Sen. Mike Enzi (R-Wyo.), Sen. Blanche Lincoln (D-
Ark.), Rep. Mike Castle (R-Del.) and Rep. Frank D. Lucas (R-Okla.).104 
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Appendix A: Revolving Doors 
 
 
Figure 5: Former Members of Congress, Congressional Aides and Executive 
Branch Officials Who Lobbied Vaccines or Pandemic Issues, 2004-2005 
Lobbyist Client Name(s) Firm Name(s) Revolving Door Connection(s) 
Rebecca Anderson  Wyeth Williams and Jensen 
- Staff, Department of Energy; 
- Legislative Affairs Office Transition Team, 
Bush-Cheney Transition Team; 
- Administrative Assistant, White House Office 
of Legislative Affairs 
Edward Baxter  Chiron Corporation 
Parry, Romani, 
DeConcini and 
Symms 
- Chief Counsel and Staff Director, 
Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights, and 
Trademarks 
Michael S. Berman Chiron Corporation 
Duberstein 
Group 
- Aide, Office of Vice President Mondale, 
1977-1981 
Roger Blauwet Merck, Wyeth Canfield and Associates - Tax Counsel, Sen. Max Baucus (D-Mont.) 
Kenneth Bowler  Pfizer Pfizer - Staff Director, House Ways and Means Committee 
Dale Bumpers  Sanofi Pasteur 
Arent Fox 
Kintner Plotkin 
and Kahn 
- U.S. Sen. (D-Ark.), 1975-1998 
Brian Carey Chiron Corporation 
Foley, Hoag and 
Eliot 
- Legislative Aide, Committee on Labor and 
Human Resources 
Bertram Carp Wyeth Williams and Jensen 
- Legislative Counsel, Sen. Walter Mondale 
(D-Minn.); 
- Deputy Domestic Policy Adviser, White 
House Domestic Council 
Steven M. Champlin Chiron Corporation 
Duberstein 
Group 
- Executive Director, House Democratic 
Caucus; 
- Executive Floor Assistant, House Majority 
Whip 
Ronald Christie Hoffmann-La Roche 
Ruder Finn 
Global Public 
Affairs 
- Deputy Director, USA Freedom Corps; 
- Special Assistant, White House under 
President George W. Bush 
Dack Dalrymple Sanofi Pasteur Dalrymple and Associates 
- Counsel, Subcommittee on Health and the 
Environment, House Energy and Commerce 
Committee; 
- Legislative Assistant, Rep. Paul Rogers (D-
Fla.) 
Dennis DeConcini Chiron Corporation 
Parry, Romani, 
DeConcini and 
Symms 
- U.S. Sen. (D-Ariz.), 1977-1994 
Brent Del Monte 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
- Legislative Director, Rep. Tom Bliley (R-Va.); 
- Senior Counsel, House Energy and 
Commerce Committee 
Quin D. Dodd 
Genaco 
Biomedical, 
Sanofi Pasteur, 
Hollis Eden 
Pharmaceuticals 
 
Larson Dodd 
LLC 
- Legislative Assistant, Sen. Kay Bailey 
Hutchison (R-Texas); 
- Legislative Assistant and Counsel, Rep. Joe 
Skeen (R-N.M.) 
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Agnes Dover 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
Hogan and 
Hartson 
- Deputy General Counsel, Department of 
Energy 
Raissa H. Downs Tarplin, Downs, Young 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
- Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Legislation, Department of Health and Human 
Services 
Kenneth M. Duberstein Chiron Corporation 
Duberstein 
Group 
- Deputy Undersecretary, Department of 
Labor; 
- Deputy Chief and Chief of Staff, White 
House, Reagan administration; 
- Assistant to the President for Legislative 
Affairs, White House Office of Legislative 
Affairs 
Vic Fazio Chiron Corporation 
Clark and 
Weinstock - U.S. Rep. (D-Calif.), 1979-1998 
Carl Feldbaum 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
- Inspector General, Defense Intelligence, 
Department of Defense; 
- Chief of Staff, Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.); 
- Assistant to the Secretary, Department of 
Energy 
Jack Fields Sanofi Pasteur Twenty-First Century Group - U.S. Rep. (R-Texas), 1981-1996 
Henry Gandy Chiron Corporation 
Duberstein 
Group 
- White House Liaison Officer, Reagan 
Administration; 
- Aide, Rep. Tom Loeffler (R-Texas); 
- Aide, Rep. Trent Lott (R-Miss.) 
John Haddow Chiron Corporation 
Parry, Romani, 
DeConcini and 
Symms 
- Aide, Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) 
Ilisa Halpern Sanofi Pasteur 
Arent Fox 
Kintner Plotkin 
and Kahn 
- Legislative Aide, Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-
Calif.) 
J. Steven Hart Wyeth Williams and Jensen 
- Assistant to the Chair, President’s Task 
Force on ERISA Reorganization, White 
House Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB); 
- Special Assistant, Assistant Attorney General 
for Legal Policy, Department of Justice; 
- Staff, Department of Labor 
Shannon Hembree 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
PodestaMattoon - White House, Deputy Director of Correspondence and Presidential Messages 
Susan B. Hirschmann Wyeth Williams and Jensen 
- Chief of Staff, Rep. Tom DeLay (R-Texas);  
- Chief of Staff, Rep. Van Hilleary (R-Tenn.) 
Claudia James Chiron Corporation PodestaMattoon 
- Legislative Assistant, Rep. Chris Dodd (D-
Conn.); 
- Senior Legislative Assistant, Rep. Peter 
Peyser (D-N.Y.) 
Courtney Johnson MedImmune Inc. Alpine Group - Staff Research Assistant, House Energy and Commerce Committee 
Michael S. Johnson 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
OB-C Group 
- Chief of Staff and Press Secretary for the 
House Minority Leader, Rep. Robert Michel 
(R-Ill.) 
Bronwen Kaye Wyeth Wyeth - Legislative Assistant, Sen. Evan Bayh (D-Ind.) 
David Keaney Chiron Corporation 
Chiron 
Corporation 
- Counsel, House Energy and Commerce 
Committee; 
- Executive Assistant, Sen. James L. Buckley 
(R-N.Y.) 
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Thomas Keating 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
OB-C Group 
- Director of Policy Services and House 
Sergeant, Arms Control Bureau, Department 
of Defense; 
- Professional Staff, Office of the House 
Sergeant At Arms 
Paul Kim Chiron Corporation 
Foley, Hoag and 
Eliot 
- Counsel, Sen. David Pryor (D-Ark.); 
- Counsel, Rep. Henry Waxman (D-Calif.); 
- Deputy Staff Director for Health on the 
Democratic side, Senate Health, Education, 
Labor and Pensions Committee 
Bruce Kuhlik 
Pharmaceutical 
Research and 
Manufacturers of 
America 
(PhRMA) 
Pharmaceutical 
Research and 
Manufacturers of 
America 
(PhRMA) 
- Assistant to the Solicitor General  
Ed Kutler Chiron Corporation 
Clark and 
Weinstock - Senior Advisor, Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) 
Dave Larson 
Genaco 
Biomedical, 
Sanofi Pasteur, 
Hollis Eden 
Pharmaceuticals 
Larson Dodd 
LLC 
- Health Policy Adviser, Sen. Bill Frist (R-
Tenn.); 
- Aide, Rep. Harris Fawell (R-Ill.) 
Steve Lawton 
 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
- Chairman, Advisory Commission on 
Childhood Vaccines, Department of Health 
and Human Services; 
- Chief Counsel, House Subcommittee on 
Health and the Environment 
Dirksen Lehman Chiron Corporation 
Clark and 
Weinstock 
- Health Counsel, Senate Health, Education, 
Labor and Pensions Committee; 
- Special Assistant to the President for 
Legislative Affairs, Senate, White House 
Office of Legislative Affairs 
Nick Littlefield Chiron Corporation 
Foley, Hoag and 
Eliot 
- Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director, 
Senate Labor and Human Relations 
Committee 
Drew Littman Chiron Corporation PodestaMattoon - Policy Director, Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.) 
Ann-Marie Lynch Wyeth Williams and Jensen 
- Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Office of 
Policy, Department of Health and Human 
Services;  
- Staff Director, Subcommittee on Health 
Karina Lynch Wyeth Williams and Jensen 
- Counsel, Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee; 
- Investigative Counsel, Senate Aging 
Committee; 
- Investigative Counsel, Sen. Charles Grassley 
(R-Iowa) 
Robert Marsh 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
OB-C Group 
- Aide, Transportation Secretary Andrew Card, 
Department of Transportation; 
- Aide, Rep. Peter Blute (R-Mass.); 
- Special Assistant to the President for 
Legislative Affairs, House, White House 
Office of Legislative Affairs, George W. Bush 
Administration 
Daniel J. Mattoon Chiron Corporation PodestaMattoon 
- Administrative Assistant and Legislative 
Director, Rep. Thomas Corcoran (R-Ill.); 
- Administrative Assistant and Legislative 
Director, Rep. John Grotberg (R-Ill.) 
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Patrick McLain GlaxoSmithKline GlaxoSmithKline - Counsel, House Energy and Commerce Committee 
Charles J. Mellody 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
OB-C Group - Aide, House Ways and Means Committee 
Daniel Meyer Chiron Corporation 
Duberstein 
Group 
- Chief of Staff, Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.); 
- Administrative Assistant, Rep. Vin Weber (R-
Minn.); 
- Legislative Director, Sen. Rudy Boschwitz (R-
Minn.) 
Elizabeth Morra Chiron Corporation PodestaMattoon 
- Press Secretary, Sen. Thad Cochran (R-
Miss.); 
- Press Secretary, House Appropriations 
Committee 
Evan Morris Hoffmann-La Roche 
Hoffmann-La 
Roche 
- Staff, Office of Presidential Advance and 
Communications Office, White House 
Chris Myrick 
Genaco 
Biomedical, 
Sanofi Pasteur, 
Hollis Eden 
Pharmaceuticals 
Larson Dodd 
LLC 
- Legislative Director, Rep. David Sweeney (R-
Texas) 
Patricia A. Nelson 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
OB-C Group - Staff member, House Ways and Means Committee 
Lawrence O'Brien III 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
OB-C Group 
- Deputy for Tax Legislation to the Assistant 
Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department 
of the Treasury 
Eric Olsen Wyeth Williams and Jensen 
- Chief of Staff and Counsel for Domestic 
Policy, Department of Agriculture 
Jonathan Orloff Sanofi Pasteur Capitol Partners - Legislative Assistant, Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) 
Geoffrey Peterson Sanofi Pasteur Sanofi Pasteur - Aide, Sen. Abraham Ribicoff (D-Conn.) 
Anthony Podesta 
 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
 
PodestaMattoon 
- Counsel, Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.); 
- Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of 
Columbia, Department of Justice 
Julie Rabinowitz Wyeth Wyeth - Tax Counsel, Sen. Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) 
Helen Rhee 
Pharmaceutical 
Research and 
Manufacturers of 
America 
(PhRMA) 
Pharmaceutical 
Research and 
Manufacturers of 
America 
(PhRMA) 
- Policy Health Subcommittee, Senior Policy 
Counsel 
James Rock Chiron Corporation 
Parry, Romani, 
DeConcini and 
Symms 
- Tax Legislative Assistant, Rep. Edgar 
Jenkins (D-Ga.); 
- Tax Legislative Assistant, Rep. Kent Hance 
(D-Texas) 
Paul Grant Rogers 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
 
Hogan and 
Hartson - U.S. Rep. (D-Fla.), 1955-1978 
Romano Romani Chiron Corporation 
Parry, Romani, 
DeConcini and 
Symms 
- Legislative Director and Staff Director, Sen. 
Vance Hartke (D-Ind.); 
- Chief of Staff, Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-
Ariz.) 
Dean Rosen Merck Mehlman Vogel Castagnetti. - Health Policy Aide, Sen. Bill Frist (R-Tenn.) 
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Andrew Rosenberg Hoffmann-La Roche 
Ruder Finn 
Global Public 
Affairs 
- Legislative Assistant, Sen. Edward Kennedy 
(D-Mass.) 
Amit Sachdev 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
- Deputy Commissioner for Policy, Food and 
Drug Administration 
Shannon Salmon Johnson and Johnson 
Johnson and 
Johnson - Staff, Senate Finance Committee 
Victor Schwartz Shook, Hardy and Bacon 
Pharmaceutical 
Research and 
Manufacturers of 
America 
(PhRMA) 
- Chairman, Federal Interagency Task Force 
on Product Liability; 
- Executive Director, Federal Interagency 
Counsel on Insurance  
Jen Siciliano 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
PodestaMattoon - Communications Aide, Senate Appropriations Committee  
Amy Smith Sanofi Pasteur Sanofi Pasteur 
- Aide, Sen. Bob Dole (R-Kansas); 
- Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, 
Department of Treasury 
 
Peter Stein 
Pharmaceutical 
Research and 
Manufacturers of 
America 
(PhRMA) 
Pharmaceutical 
Research and 
Manufacturers of 
America 
(PhRMA) 
- Aide, Sen. Rick Santorum (R-Pa.) 
Tim Stewart 
Genaco 
Biomedical, 
Sanofi Pasteur, 
Hollis Eden 
Pharmaceuticals 
Larson Dodd 
LLC - Chief of Staff, House Resources Committee 
Thaddeus Strom Chiron Corporation 
Parry, Romani, 
DeConcini and 
Symms 
- Chief Counsel and Staff Director, Sen. Strom 
Thurmond (R-S.C.); 
- Republican Chief Counsel and Staff Director, 
Senate Judiciary Committee 
Sandy Stuart Chiron Corporation 
Clark and 
Weinstock 
- Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, 
Department of Defense  
Steve Symms Chiron Corporation 
Parry, Romani, 
DeConcini and 
Symms 
- U.S. Rep., (R-Idaho) 1973-1980; 
- U.S. Sen. (R-Idaho), 1981-1992 
Linda Tarplin Tarplin, Downs, Young 
 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
- Special Assistant for Legislative Affairs, -
Senate, White House Office of Legislative 
Affairs 
Gordon Taylor Sanofi Pasteur 
Arent Fox 
Kintner Plotkin 
and Kahn 
- Chief of Staff, Rep. Chris John (D-La.) 
Carl Thorsen Hoffmann- La Roche 
American 
Continental 
Group 
- Senior Adviser for Border Enforcement, 
Department of Defense; 
- Deputy Assistant Attorney General for 
Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice; 
- Aide to Subcommittee on Crime, House 
Judiciary Committee; 
- General Counsel, Rep. Tom DeLay (R-
Texas); 
- Aide, Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) 
David Urban Hoffmann- La Roche 
American 
Continental 
Group 
- Chief of Staff, Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) 
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John Van Fossen MedImmune Inc. Artemis Strategies - Chief of Staff, Rep. Peter Hoekstra (R-Mich.) 
Vin Weber Chiron Corporation 
Clark and 
Weinstock - U.S. Rep. (R-Minn.), 1981-1992 
Larry Werner 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
- Aide, Sen. Harry Reid (D-Nev.) 
Richard White MedImmune Inc. Alpine Group - Legislative Coordinator, Sen. John Chafee (R-R.I.) 
Andrea Wilkinson Sanofi Pasteur 
Venable, 
Baetjer, Howard 
and Civiletti LLP, 
Sanofi Pasteur 
- Aide, Rep. W.J. "Billy" Tauzin (R-La.); 
- Aide, Sen. John Breaux (D-La.) 
Michael Wyatt 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
Hogan and 
Hartson 
- General Counsel, Small Business 
Administration 
Jennifer Baxendell 
Young 
Tarplin, Downs, 
Young 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
- Deputy Assistant Secretary for health in the 
office of legislation, Department of Health and 
Human Services 
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